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Foreword

T

he International Law Studies "Blue Book" series was inaugurated by the Naval War College in 1901 as a forum for essays, treatises and articles that promote a broader understanding of international law. The eighty-fourth volume of
this historic series, International Law and Military Operations, is a compilation o f
scholarly papers and remarks d er ived from the proceedings of a June 2007 conference hosted by the Naval War College.

The purpose of the conference was to address three areas of interest- law of the
sea and maritime security, the law of anned conflict and coalition operations, and
the 2006 Lebanon Conflict. Participants came to Newport from twen ty-five countries and included government officials. military commanders. representatives of
non-governmen tal organizations, esteemed intemationallaw scholars, and military
and civilian lawyers. The conference was designed to encourage a constructive dialogue on these issues by exam ining US and international perspectives to ensure a
sensible developmen t of the law, and to preserve both national and collective security
imperatives. Undoubtedly the ideas generated in this "Blue Book" volume will contribute substantially to the ongoing examination of the major legal challenges accompanying maritime operations and armed conflict in the twenty-ftrst century.
On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, I extend a warm thank-you to Major Michael D.
Carsten, US Mar ine Corps, under whose lead ership this conference was o rganized,
and who served as the editor of this volume. I also wish to than k the authors for
their invaluable contributions to this work and for engendering a greater understanding of operational law in the maritime context and of the law of armed conflict generally. Thanks also to the Lieber Society of the American Society of
International Law, cosponsorofthis conference. And, ftnally, a very special note of
gratitude goes to the Naval War College Foundation, Roger William s School of
Law and Israel Yearbook on Hu man Rights, whose tremendous support made this
conference, and, particularly, this International Law Studies volume, possible.

JACOB L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, US Navy
President, Naval War College

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

Introduction

S

ince its founding in 1884, the US Naval War College has been committed to
the study and teaching of the law im pacting military operations. As part of its
commitment, from June 20-22, 2007 the Naval War College hosted a conference
entitled lntertlational LAw and Military Operations. Initiated in 1990, with a conference addressing the targeting of enemy merchant shipping, the international law
conference series brings together internat ional scholars and practitioners, experts
in military operations and students to examine topical legal issues. Commencing
with that inaugural colloq uium, the proceedings of and papers from each succeeding conference have been published as a volwne of the Naval War College's internationally acclaimed International Law Studies (" Blue Book") series. This "Blue
Book" continues that practice.
The conference speakers explored several diverse, yet timely, subjects relevant
to the planning and conduct of military operations. These include maritime strategy and the global legal order, the law of the sea and maritime security, the law of
armed conflict, maritim e enforcement of United Nations Security Council resolutions, coalition operations, and the 2006 conflict in Lebanon. This volume of the
International Law Studies series is a compilation of remarks made during the conference and of articles that expand upon the thoughts articulated during the
conference.
The conference was o rganized by Major Michael D . Carsten, US Marine Corps,
of the International Law Department, who also served as managing editor of this
volume. The conference was cosponsored by the Lieber Society on the Law of
Armed Conflict of the American Societyof lnternational Law, and was madepossible through the support of the Naval War College Foundation, Roger Williams
University School of Law and the Israel Yearbook on HI/man Rights. Without the
dedicated efforts, support and assistance of these individuals and organizations the
conference would not have taken place.
I once again give thanks to Professor Emeritus Jack Grunawalt and Captain
Ralph Thomas, JAGC, US Navy (Ret.), who undertook the lion's share of the editing p rocess. Indeed, this edition m arks the sixth consecutive "Blue Book" on which
they have shared editing responsibilities. Without their tireless efforts and devotion to the Naval War College and to the International Law Studies series, this publication would not have been possible.

Special thanks go to Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, President of the Naval War
College, and Professor Barney Rubel, Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare
Studies, for their leadership and support in the planning and conduct of the confere nce, and the publication of this volume.
The International Law Studies series is published by the Naval War College and
distributed worldwide to US and international military organizations, academic
institutions and libraries. This" Blue Book" and its predecessors evidence the Naval
War College's long-standing dedication to the scholarly discourse and understanding oflegal issues at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

DENNIS L. MANDSAGER
Professor of Law & Chairman
International Law Department

x

Preface

I

mmediately following the conclusion of the conference, Commander Eric
HUft, JAGC, US Naval Reserve, an officer assigned to the reserve unit support-

ing the International Law Department, expertly prepared a conference summary
which captures the highlights of the presentation of each of the conference speakers. The remarks that follow are, with limited editing to conform to the "Blue
Book" style, that swnmary. My thanks are extended to Commander Hurt for this
outstanding work; it certainly eased my work as editor.
I also extend my thanks and appreciation to Susan Meyer afthe Desktop Publishing Office here at the Naval War College. Ms. Meyer has been responsible for
preparation of the page proofs of eight volumes of the International Law Studies
series. The high quality of this volwne is again testimony to her professionalism
and outstanding expertise. My thanks also go to Me. Albert Fassbender and Ms.
Shannon Cole, two superb proofreaders, who are Ms. Meyer's colleagues in the
Desktop Publishing Office. The "final" article that left the International Law Department was a far superior article when it returned fro m that office.
I encourage readers of this volume to first read the following summ ary. It will
whet your appetite for the individual articles prepared by the speakers and their insightful analyses of many of the challenging international law issues facing military
forces today.
Keynote Address
In his address opening the conference, Professor Allen reflected that three decades
have elapsed since law of the sea scholar Daniel Patrick O'Connell challenged conventional thinking with his book Tile Influence of Law on Sea Power. O'Connell
wrote that the law of the sea is the stimulus to sea power and that future naval operations planning staffs must acquire an appreciation of the law. Professor Allen
used this groundbreaking book as the backdrop for a discussion of the development of the new maritime strategy of the United States. During the summer of
2006, the Chief of Naval Operations tasked the Naval War College with developing
ideas that will guide the team charged with crafting the new maritime strategy. The
new strategy will be nested within the security strategies which emanate from the
National Security Strategy of the United States. This is not the first time the US
Navy has launched a grand strategy development project, but common to all of the
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predecessor documents is a lack of express discussion of the role of law and legal institutions in naval operations.
This unanimous agreement on the need to reference international law arises
from the role of law as an ordering force. Order is necessary for successful trade,
transportation and the interaction of nations pursuing their national interests.
Professor Allen observed that the rule sets which bring about this order will not always be voluntarily complied with and that, for that, enforcement must be added.
This enforcement requires new ways of thinking. The historical " DIME" construct
of diplomatic, information, military and econom ic methods of engagem ent must
be supplemented by law enforcement, judicial and cultural measures. To achieve
these goals within a maritime strategy, Professor Allen advanced the idea that law,
as a proven promoter of order, security and prosperity, can be a powerful unifying
theme. Law provides the language and logic of cooperation. It is clear that respect
for international law and our recognition of such will allow the United States to
shape the global and legal orders as a good -faith participant in the system.

Panel I - Law of the Sea and Maritime Security
Rear Admiral Horace B. Robertson Jr., JAGC, US Navy (Ret. ), Judge Advocate
General of the United States Navy from 1974 to 1976, opened the panel by providing a historical background for the US position on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention ). The United States, as early
as 1966, under President Johnson proclaimed that the seas must not be the source
of a land grab. This position was reinforced by President Nixon's 1970 call fora seabed treaty. In 1982, then-President Reagan announced the US opposition to the
1982 LOS Convention, citing the machinery of implementation. President Reagan
detailed his specific objections to the treaty. In the time since these objections were
registered, they have all been addressed. Despite these remedies, opposition to US
accession to the Convention persists.
Rear Admiral Robertson outlined the continuing objections to the 1982 LOS
Convention. These objections all appear to be ideological and lack substance. Chief
among the opposition's arguments is that a ratification of the Convention is a surrender of US sovereignty to the United Nations. This is not supported by the text of
the document or the machinery used to administer the Convention. Opponents
also claim that the United States need no t ratify UNCLOS, as customary international law provides all of the same benefits. While customary international law
does set forth a legal framework, it does not provide the precision of UNCLOS or
the institutions by which to seek resolution of disputes.
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The Staff Judge Advocate for United States Pacific Command, Captain Raul
(Pete) Pedrozo, JAGC, US Navy, observed that there are many challenges to free
navigation of the seas. These challenges include regimes adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), such as establishment of mandatory ship reporting systems and particularly sensitive sea areas (PSSA). These IMO measures
have the practical effect of impeding freedom of navigation in designated portions
of the ocean. Captain Pedrozo indicated that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has requested the designation of over 140,000
square miles of ocean surrounding the Northwest Hawaiian Islands as a PSSA.
Such a designation, in his view, is not necessary and will pose significant challenges
for the US Coast Guard and NOAA to enforcement of the mandatory ship reporting system that will encircle the PSSA. The proliferation oflMO-adopted measures
could also adversely impact the operations of the US Navy worldwide.
The Judge Advocate General for the United States Coast Guard, Rear Admiral
William Baumgartner, US Coast Guard, spoke on the increasing importance of
conditions on port entry as a tool for ensuring maritime security and the need for
an analytical structure to evaluate proposed entry conditions. Given the importance of port security, the Coast Guard has developed a comprehensive strategy to
combat maritime terrorism called Maritime Sentinel which takes a three-pronged
approach: 1) achieving maritime domain awareness, 2) undertaking effective maritime security and response operations, and 3) creating and overseeing an effective
maritime security regime. Conditions on port entry, such as advanced notice of arrival for commercial vessels arriving from abroad, are and will continue to be an
important part of executing this strategy.
Rear Admiral Baumgartner noted that additional conditions ma y be added in
the future and suggested that the following questions should be asked in evaluating
those conditions:
• Will the proposed condition be effective in addressing an issue of significant
importance?
• Is there a better, less expensive and less objectionable way to accomplish the
same policy goal?
• w ill it be consistent with customary and conventional international law of
the sea, i.e., does it impinge on important navigational freedoms?
• Does it have a rational nexus in time, place and purpose to the actual entry
into port?
The goal of enhancing national security is most effectively met by stopping threats
before they reach our shores. Conditions on port entry are one of the most effective
tools in accomplishing this but they must be prudent and well considered.
xiii
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Professor Guifang (Julia) Xue of Ocean University of China observed that
China is moving from being a State historically focused on coastal State interests to
becoming a maritime State. This move results from China's growth as a major
influencer of globalization . The importance of free navigation, as reflected in the
1982 LOS Convention, has caused a reevaluation of China's laws and policies. This
reevaluation takes the fo rm of modifying Chinese domestic law to come into compliance with the Convention and working to settle tensions between China and
various States, such as Taiwan, Japan and Vietnam.

Luncheon Address
Rear Admiral Schachte began by outlining how opponents of the 1982 LOS Convention have dealt in misrepresentations to defeat its approval by the US Senate.
These misrepresentations center mainly on the argument that the Convention will
rob the United States of its sovereignty. In fact, there is nothing in the treaty which
takes away from the maritime power of the United States. Opponents also claim
the Convention will serve as a threat to US freedom of navigation on the high seas.
With over one hundred illegal claims against navigation, the 1982 LOS Convention
stands as the mechanism which will allow for greater freedom of navigation and the
resolution of impediments to movement.
The Convention provides a stable legal environment which improves the US
ability to succeed in the Global War on Terror. Despite claims to the contrary, the
Convention does not give the United Nations the authority to tax the United States
or to board US ships. Accession to the 1982 LOS Convention would give the
United States the ability to shape and influence world maritime policy and law.
With President Bush's endorsement of the Convention and a large number of senators indicating support, Rear Admiral Schachte expressed hope that the Senate
will soon provide its advice and consent, but stressed that party or non-party, a robust
freedom of navigation program must continue to be a part of US oceans policy.

Panel n - Law of A nned Conflict
Professor Yoram Dinstein , Professor Emeritus, Tel Aviv University, spoke on direct participation of civilians in hostilities and targeted killings in the context of recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Israel. The principle of distinctionbetween civilians and combatants, as well as civilian objects and military objectives-is the most basic principle of the international law of armed conflict. Professor Dinstein noted that the defmition of military objectives (grounded on nature,
location, purpose or use) is very open ended, since every civil object-including a
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hospital or a church-is liable to be used by the enemy, thereby turning into a military objective. Hence, the key element in practice is the requirement of proportionality, meaning that-when a military objective is attacked-incidental injuries to
civilians and damage to civilian objects m ust not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage gained. Of course, what is considered excessive is often a subjective assessment made in the mind of the beholder, subject only to a test
of reasonableness.
On the subject of direct participation of civilians in hostilities, Professor Dinstein
observed that there is a virtual consensus that, at those times when the direct participation is occurring, the individual may be targeted. But what is he in terms of classification? Professor Dinstein believes that the person has become a combatant,
and indeed (more often than not) an unlawful combatant. The International Committee of the Red Cross (1CRC), on the other hand, adheres to the view that he remains a civilian (although agreeing that he may be attacked while directly
participating in hostilities). The difference of opinion has a practical consequence
only when the person is captured. Professor Dinstein takes the position that, as an
unlawful combatant, the person loses the general protection of the Geneva Conventions and only benefits from some minimal standards of protection, whereas
the ICRC maintains that the general protection of civilian detainees under Geneva
Convention IV remains in effect.
Professor Dinstein also addressed the issue of human shields. When a civilian is
voluntarily attempting to shield a military objective from attack, he is directly participating in hostilities. As for the involuntary use of civilians to shield military objectives, the act is unlawful and even (under the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court) a war crime. But what if involuntary human shields are used?
Does it mean that the principle of proportionality remains intact, so that the opposing belligerent may be barred from attacking the military objective? This is the
position taken by Additional Protocol I of 1977. Professor Dinstein disagrees. In
his opinion, under customary international law, the principle of proportionality
must be stretched in such an instance and applied with greater flexibility. If the
outcome is that a large number of civilians are killed, their blood is on the hands of
the belligerent party that abused them as human shields.
Doctor Nils Melzer, of the International Committee of the Red Cross, stressed
that in the current conflict against terrorism, there is no defined battlefield. This
leads to confusion in distinguishing between civilians and combatants. Civilians
enjoy protection under intemationallaw until such time as they participate in hostilities. Unfortunately, there is no clarity on what it means to participate. An ICRCI
Asser Institute initiative on direct participation seeks to define the term "direct
participation" in the context of the concept of civilians, the nature of hostilities and
xv
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the modalities of the suspension of hostilities. He defined direct participation in
hostilities as action taken by an individual which is designed to have an adverse effect on the military operations of a party.
Doctor Melzer indicated that the duration of this participation is also difficult to
quantify. Concrete steps toward the preparation of a hostile act, deployment to
commit the act, commission of the act and return from deployment are all considered by the JCRC to be part of the hostile act, and cause civilians to lose their protection under international law. Once these actions are complete, the civilians
regain their protected status and are not lawfully subject to attack. As with all combat actions, proportionality must factor into the targeting decision involving the
civilian engaged in the commission of a hostile act. Ultimately, if there is anyquestion concerning the status of a civilian, the presumption must be that the individual is protected and not subject to lawful targeting.
Professor David Turns of the University of Liverpool detailed the recent House
of Lords decision in the case of AI-Skeini. This case involved the deaths of one Iraqi
civilian while in British military custody, and five others during British military operations on the streets of Basra. The House of Lords held that an inquiry should be
held into the death of a prisoner in custody in Iraq in certain extraordinary circumstances. Such an inquiry is appropriate when the person is within the jurisdiction
of the United Kingdom for purposes of British human rights law. This is a factspecific determination that centers upon whether the individual is in British custody. In this case, the death of the individual who was in British custody requires an
inquiry under the law. In situations where individuals are killed and not in British
custody, they are not within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for human
rights law purposes, and therefore there is no requirement for an inquiry. In effect,
when the British Army deploys to a foreign country, it takes with it British human
rights law which must be applied to those under its control and custody.
In closing, Professor Turns noted that the United Kingdom's legal view of the
British presence in Iraq is similar to the position taken with regard to the presence
of British forces in Northern Ireland during the "Troubles.» In both cases, the British military was invited to aid the existing government and quell unrest; therefore
detainees are not prisoners of war under Geneva Convention III, because the conflict is not a war. Professor Turns concluded by arguing that no matter how the
Global War on Terror is classifi ed, detainees should be treated either as prisoners of
war under Geneva Convention III or in accordance with Common Article 3 of the
four 1949 Geneva Conventions and be given the maximum benefit of such
treatment.
Ashley Deeks from the Legal Adviser's Office at the US Department of State explained that the United States has engaged in a detailed, ongoing analysis of the
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rules pertaining to the treatment and classification of detainees. The rules and policies regarding detainees that the United States put in place in 2002 have evolved
considerably, due to input from all three branches of the US government. Under
the present regimes in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, the detention of individuals is the subject of constant and ongoing review. The United States has
taken concrete steps to ensure that detainees are treated appropriately and that
their statuses and ongoing detention are reviewed periodically.
Ms. Deeks noted that the situation in Afghanistan is complicated, given the
makeup of the coalition involved in operations. Differe nt members of the coalition
have different domestic laws and policies concerning detainees. In addition, different countries are signatories to different law of war and human rights treaties.
These factors, combined with the difficult-to-classify nature of the operation,
make detainee operations challenging. Despite these challenges, the United States
has achieved a sustainable detainee regime in Afghanistan.
Panel III - New Developments in Maritime Enforcement
of UN Security Council Resolutions
Professor Alfred Soons, University of Utrecht, opened this panel by raising the question of who may enforce UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs).ln short, may
a non-flag State take action against a vessel outside the national waters of that State?
The answer depends on the nature of the Security Council resolution. These resolutions cover many areas, including economic sanctions, counterterrorism, counterproliferation and peacekeeping. The interpretation of these resolutions can be
undertaken by Security Council--established sanctions committees, UN member
States, domestic courts and international tribunals. When interpreting these resolutions it is important to note that the UNSCRs are not governed by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties because the resolutions are not treaties. The interpretation must be driven by looking to customary international law and the
general principles of law on interpretation. Given the special nature ofUNSCRs, it
is also helpful to look at the statements of Security Council members in passing the
resolution and the prior resolutions and practices of the Council.
Nevertheless, as UNSCRs often involve a potential for incursion into national
sovereignty, it is important to take a narrow approach to interpreting the resolution. This may lessen the possibility of an incursion upon sovereignty. If there is
significant doubt about the meaning or intent of a UNSCR and its application to
particular circumstances, the proper action to take would be to return to the Security Council and ask for a determination as to whether a breach has occurred.
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Professor Soons closed by stating that when action is taken in a State's territorial
waters, the UNSCR must state explicitly that force is allowed .
Professor Robin Churchill, University of Dundee, Scotland, focused on potential conflicts between UNSCRs and the 1982 LOS Convention. It is clear that
UNSCRs may routinely interfere with navigational rights reflected in the Convention. This interference may arise from activities occurring during the enforcement
of economic sanctions, prevention of trafficking in weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) technology and the prevention of terrorism. These conflicts take place
when the Security Council, through a resolution, places limits on what a State may
do upon the seas.
Professor Churchill then turned to the question of resolving conflicts between
Security Council resolutions and the 1982 LOS Convention. He observed that pursuant to Article 103 of the UN Charter, UNSCRs will always prevail over provisions
of that or any other international agreement. When conflicts do occur, Professor
Churchill argued that they may be resolved by one of the various dispute settlement bodies, previously chosen by the parties to the dispute under Article 287 of
the LOS Convention. Of course, these decisions bind only the parties to the dispute
and the rulings have no precedential value. Finally, these dispute resolution bodies
may decide the dispute but they have no authority to declare that a UN Security
Council resolution is invalid.
University of Central Lancashire Professor Dr. Keyuan Zou observed that China
is taking domestic action to comply with international non-proliferation standards
and regimes. Force in support of these regimes should be as limited as possible and
should be used only when explicitly authorized. Professor Keyuan noted that the
1982 LOS Convention has no provision authorizing the use of force and therefore
principles of humanity must be used to resolve conflicts. If force is considered, it
must be as narrow a use as possible. In fact, before force may be authorized, it can
be argued that the UN Security Council resolution must specifically reference Article 42 of the UN Charter. The use of force in a maritime matter is a law enforcement action, the scope and nature of which must also be controlled by customary
international law, rules of engagement and an analysis as to proportionality and
necessity. These considerations are all secondary to the consideration of the sanctity of human life and the need to preserve it.

Panel N - Coalition Operations
Brigadier General Ken Watkin, the Judge Advocate General of Canadian Forces,
began by noting that the Global War on Terror is referred to in Canada as the Campaign Against Terrorism. One of the challenges for nations involved in coalition
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operations is reaching agreement as to the nature of the conflict. This includes the
question of whether you can have an international conflict against non -State actors. lnternational law was designed with the idea that two State actors would be involved in a conflict; however, the majority of contemporary conflicts are internal to
a State. At a minimum, there appears to be a consensus that Common Article 3 of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions would apply to conflicts such as Afghanistan. Additionally, other treaties will be applicable, but not all coalition partners are bound
by the same treaties. For example, Canada and many other nations are bound by
Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, while the United
States is not a party to that treaty. Although AP I does not apply as a matter oflaw to
most conflicts, it is integrated into the doctrine of Canadian Forces. This has not
presented any significant problems.
Unlike some nations, Canada recognizes the concept of "unlawful combatant."
In examining standards of treatment of unlawful combatants, it is important to
rely on both customary international and "black letter" law.
Different legal obligations and approaches sometimes cause friction within coalition operations. This can occur in the area of targeting; however, those perceived
differences may not be that great. Canada and the United Stateshaveslightlydifferent definitions as to what constitutes a military object. The Canadian definition
uses AP I wording and does not incorporate the "war sustaining capability" that
the United States brings within its definition. Generally, however, the difference is
potentially quite small since Canada, like many other AP I nations, is of the view
that in considering proportionality the military advantage to conducting an attack
must be considered as a whole and not be limited to individual attacks.
When disagreements arise within a coalition, they must be resolved or the objecting party will not be able to participate in the targeting mission. On other issues, such as the anti-personnel mine Ottawa Convention, problems rarely arise.
This is due to the fact that even though most NATO members are signatories and
the United States is not, the nature of operations does not lend itself to consideration of the use of the non-command-detonated anti-personnel mines governed
by that treaty.
Next, the Director General, Australian Defence Forces Legal Services, Commodore Vicki McConachie, underscored the importance of close coordination among
coalition partners. This coordination results from the fad that coalition partners
may not all be signatories to the same treaties regarding international law and the
treatment of prisoners. In situations where the partners are signatories to the same
convention or treaty, they may still have different interpretations of their obligations. These differences must be quiddy addressed. Accommodation of the various
partners' responsibilities under both international law and their own domestic
xix
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laws is necessary to maintain a coalition. The nature of the current global conflict
has created a number of uncertainties. Before the attacks of9/ l l, there was some
certainty as to which parts of Additional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions the United States did not accept. Post-9/1 1 there is less certainty on this issue,
calling for a greater need to coordinate on the proper application of the concepts
contained in Additional Protocol I.
Despite these uncertainties, Commodore McConachie feels the United States is
still able to reach accord on important issues such as targeting and the applicable
rules of engagement. In the event a specific operation violates a coalition partner's
legal obligations there must be an "opt out" provision. This provision allows coalition partners to continue their participation in the overall coalition, while not participating in operations which violate their legal obligations. These obligations can
be either international or domestic, as Australian forces are subject to all Australian
domestic law while deployed in support of coalition operations.
Captain Neil Brown, of the Royal Navy Legal Services, observed that for coalitions to work well there can be no barriers to communication, and that includes the
sharing of intelligence. The key approach of stafflegal advisers in mission planning
is to identify, minimize and thereafter to manage different national legal positions.
In planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and despite distinct national positions on
the jus ad bellum, this collaborative approach all but eliminated substantive differences between the United States and the United Kingdom on the application of international humanitarian law (IHl). The United Kingdom certainly found during
the prosecution of the campaign that IHL was entirely appropriate for modern
conventional warfare. The fac t that US and UK forces operated throughout under
their own national targeting directives and rules of engagement was not important.
Of much greater significance was the fact that they were applying, in almost every
respect, the same law. Some issues were more difficult to resolve, such as the
United Kingdom's treaty obligations in relation to anti-personnellandmines used
in the "victim-initiated mode," but in the context of the high-intensity warfighting
phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (March-May2003) none were insurmountable.
In relation to prisoners of war, internees and detainees, a common position on
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Geneva Convention IV ensured maximum scope for a coalition approach to the prisoners of war, including
their transfer between coalition partners. Although different national approaches
were initially taken on the use of lethal force against escaping enemy prisoners of
war, a coalition position was agreed which required guards to take into account
whether the scale and character of any escape represented an imminent threat to
life. Coalition positions in 2003 were developed to reflect Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and Geneva Convention IV requirements, such as the
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expedited screening process in advance of Article 5 procedures to detennine status.
The coalition position was more difficult to sustain when, although United Nations
Security Council resolutions maintained the "imperative reasons of security" provision of Article 78 of Geneva Convention IV to intern, some commanders pressed
for a wider approach based on the requirement to gather intelligence.
The Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the loint Chiefs of Staff, Colonel Ronald
Reed, USAF, concluded the panel with an approach to coordinating coalition
operations. This coordination is designed to reduce the incidental friction that
arises between partners. Understanding that this friction is inevitable, he indicated
that as much pre-contingency planning as possible should take place. The planning
must ensure that operations are based upon defined international law. To the extent possible, rules of engagement should be developed that seek to reconcile partner differences. Identifying pre-contingency coalition forces to react to and deal
with certain situations allows for a more efficient deployment of forces . The precontingency planning is not a binding set of rules; rather, it is a framework or starting point for dealing with the specifics of certain contingencies.
Once forces are deployed and the coalition is actively engaged, it is imperative
that, if multiple rules of engagement are in use, adjacent forces are briefed on and
made aware of what those contain. As the coalition begins operations, other incidental friction will arise. This has occurred recently when a coalition partner's domestic courts conducted investigations of battlefield incidents and then sought to
exercise jurisdiction over US soldiers. The United States opposed this, thereby creating incidental friction. While friction will always be present, all possible steps
must be taken to minimize it, since legal friction can adversely impact coalition
cohesion.

Panel V - Lebanon Conflict
Professor Michael Schmitt, who held the Stockton Chair of International Law at
the Naval War College during academic year 2007-08, began the panel with a review of the historical events leading up to the 2006 Lebanon conflict. These events
included elections in which Hezbollah gained positions in the Lebanese government; the capture of Israeli soldiers; and rocket attacks launched against northern
Israel. The actions of Hezbollah culminated with the Israeli government sending
military forces into southern Lebanon.
Professor Schmitt then began the evaluation ofIsrael's actions in the context of
international law. Israel announced that it was commencing attacks pursuant to a
right of self-defense against Hezbollah under Article 51 of the UN Charter. As a
precursor to the question of self-defense, it is important to determine the status of
xxi
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the attacks against Israel. A UN inquiry into the growing conflict found that
Hezbollah was part of the government of Lebanon and should be treated as a militia under Article 4 ofthe Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners o f War. Lebanon disclaimed afflliation with Hezbollah and stated that
Hezbollah was acting independently of the State of Lebanon.
Professor Schmitt noted that the curren t state o f international law on what constitutes State action by a group is in flux. Under the Nicaragua decision of the International Court oflustice (ICn, fo r a group's actions to be attributed to a State, the
State must control and sponsor the group. This decision has been much criticized
and does not appear to be consistent with current world reality. Hezbollah was
present in the government of Lebanon; it at tim es had some support from government organs and was in control of much of southern Lebanon. So, while the Lebanese government may not have officially sponsored or controlled Hezbollah, there
were significant ties between the State and Hezbollah.
Assuming that Hezbollah was not a State actor fo r purposes of the attacks on
Lebanon, it is clear from the Caroline case that non-State actors are capable o f
armed attacks against States. In fact, 9/ 11 illustrated that non-State actors are capable of devastating attacks. This was recognized by the world community through its
support of the US attacks on the Taliban following 9/1 1.
Israel was justified in its attacks regardless of the classification of Hezbollah.
While there is some IC) precedent suggesting Israel could not invoke Article 51 absent an attack by a State actor, this position is weak. Article 51 makes no m ention of
State action as a prerequisite to self-defense and, as the UN Security Council resolutions following 9/11 demonstrate, attacks triggering Article 51 need not be made
by a State actor.
Professor Dinstein indicated Israel's action could be classified as extraterritorial
law enforcement. Much like the facts of the Caroline case, Hezbollah was acting
fro m within Lebanon, Israel asked Lebanon to police its bord ers in order to prevent Hezbollah's actions, and Lebanon either could not or would not stop
Hezbollah, the result being that Israel undertook the policing action itself. States
have an obligation to police their territory or risk having their sovereignty violated.
Evaluating Israel's self-defense in terms of necessity, immediacy and proportionality shows that Israel's response was appropriate. Israel's action was necessary and
immediate, as it was under direct attack. Finally, as to proportionality, Israel's operations were tied to defensive m easures to protect itself from rocket attacks by
Hezbollah.
Sarah Leah Whitson of Human Rights Watch advised that Human Rights
Watch had sent teams o f investigators to Lebanon both during and following the
conflict. These investigators conducted numerous interviews of members of the
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local population, and of representatives of the Israel Defense Forces, Lebanese government, Hezbollah, humanitarian agencies, journalists, hospitals and local officials. The findings of this investigation will be set out in three pending reports
examining Israel's and Hezbollah's conduct. The investigation revealed very few
instances of Hezbollah using the local population as shields for its attacks on IsraeL
In addition, very few of Hezbollah's rocket-launching sites and munitions and
arms storage facilities were in dose proximity to civilian objects. Thus, there were
few Hezbollah actions which resulted in civilian deaths.
Colonel Pnina Sharvit-Baruh, Head, International Law Department, Israel Defense Forces, outlined the Lebanon conflict from the Israeli perspective. It was dear
from intelligence obtained that Hezbollah was making every effort to blend in with
the civilian population. This blending ignored the distinction between civilians
and combatants, and resulted in Hezbollah's shielding its military activities with
civilians. Israel went to great lengths to limit civilian casualties. Targeting decisions
were made so as to always attempt to leave one road open for civilian evacuation.
Also, certain dual-use infrastructure was not targeted because it would have had a
disproportionate impact upon the civilian population.
Colonel Sharvit-Baruh noted that there were civilian casualties. These casualties
were not excessive given the expected military benefit of most of the targets. Targeting was taken very seriously and decisions were made based upon a proportionality review. These decisions were difficult given the nature of the asymmetrical
warfare involved while fighting a non-State actor that does not comply with the law
of armed conflict.

Conclusion
In dosing, it is our sincere desire that the works of the preeminent practitioners,
scholars and leaders who contributed so graciously to this volume assist those seeking answers to today's hard questions and propagate thoughts and action that
shape the course of the future.
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